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State v. Etheridge: The General Fear Theory
and Intrafamilial Sexual Assault
A man drives his daughter to a secluded area. He tells her to lie down on
the car seat. He has sexual intercourse with her. He began having intercourse
with his daughter when she was eleven; she is now fifteen. Is this rape?
In 1985 the North Carolina Supreme Court, on similar facts, held no rape
had occurred because the victim's submitting to the act out of a "general fear" of
her father was insufficient to constitute forcible rape.' The North Carolina
Supreme Court recently reversed that decision, holding such a general fear of a
parent can suffice as the force necessary to commit a forcible sexual assault.
2
This decision, State v. Etheridge,3 represents a more realistic approach to in-
trafamilial sexual abuse and the relationship between the abuser and the victim.
The popular conception of a person who sexually assaults children is some-
one on the fringe of society, addicted to alcohol or drugs, insane, or sexually
frustrated, but certainly a stranger.4 If this stereotype were accurate, preventing
child sexual abuse through identification and prosecution of the assailant would
be less difficult. Unfortunately, the stereotype is not accurate. The vast majority
of victims of child sexual abuse know their abusers. Approximately eight out of
ten abusers are members or friends of the victim's family.5
A special concept of force is required to adequately reflect the nature of
these relationships. The decision in Etheridge stands as an attempt to accommo-
date the peculiar problems of intrafamilial sexual assault. This Note examines
Etheridge and the history of the "general fear" theory in North Carolina. The
Note concludes that Etheridge is a sound decision and was much needed to fill
the gaps in North Carolina's statutory scheme of preventing child sexual abuse.
According to the State's evidence, Curtis Etheridge began sexual activity
with his son when the son was age eight and with his daughter when she was
1. State v. Lester, 70 N.C. App. 757, 321 S.E.2d 166 (1984), aff'dper curiam, 313 N.C. 595,
330 S.E.2d 205 (1985).
2. State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 47, 352 S.E.2d 673, 681 (1987).
3. 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987).
4. J. MOHR, R. TURNER & M. JERRY, PEDOPHILIA AND EXHIBrrIONISM 20 (1964).
5. Id. at 28; R. ESKAPA, BIZARRE SEX 159-161 (1987); F. RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET 2
(1980); Summit, Causes, Consequences, Treatment and Prevention of Sexual Assault Against Chil-
dren, in ASSAULT AGAINST CHILDREN 47, 49-51 (J. Meier ed. 1985). The overwhelming majority
of child sexual abusers are male. F. RusH, supra, at 2; Summit, supra, at 51. Most are under 35, of
normal intelligence, and from a wide range of social, economic, and educational backgrounds. R.
ESKAPA, supra, at 158-61. Although the abusers' motivations vary, "[m]ost offenders are relatively
indifferent to the needs and feelings of children, even though the adult may see himself as uniquely
caring and devoted to his child love." Summit, supra, at 52.
Surveys conducted on adult women indicate that 20 to 30 percent were sexually victimized
before reaching age 13. Summit, supra, at 49-50. Estimation of male victims has proven difficult due
to social attitudes making males reluctant to admit the abuse. Id. at 50. A high possibility exists
that boys are abused more often than girls "since they are the preferred target of habitual
pedophiles." Id. The average age of the victim is between I 1 and 14, and parent-child sexual abuse
usually begins when the child is age eight. Id.
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six. 6 Defendant did not use excessive violence or threats against his children.7
The charges arose from five sexual incidents in late 1984 and early 1985. Four
of these incidents consisted of vaginal intercourse between the defendant and the
daughter, then age twelve, the fifth was an instance of anal intercourse with his
son, then age thirteen.
On the day of the fifth incident, Etheridge was home alone with his son.
8
Etheridge told his son to go upstairs, followed him to his room, and ordered him
to undress. The child refused. The father told him to "[d]o it anyway,"9 and
the child complied. Etheridge then had anal intercourse with the boy.10 After
the act, Etheridge threatened harm to the son if he revealed what had occurred.
The son described the incident to a friend who alerted the Department of Social
Services. 1 1
Etheridge was convicted of a second-degree sexual offense 12 for the incident
with his son and four counts of first-degree rape for the four incidents with his
daughter.' 3 Findings of force and lack of consent were not required to convict
Etheridge of the first degree rape charges since the daughter was under thirteen
and intercourse with her fell under the absolute prohibition of the "statutory
rape" provision. 14 The trial judge instructed the jury that the boy's fear of his
father based upon the authoritarian nature of the parental relationship would be
sufficient to constitute the force necessary to commit second-degree sexual of-
fense.1 5 The defendant objected to this instruction and appealed, claiming the
6. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 36, 352 S.E.2d at 675.
7. The boy testified his father once threatened to send the child to training school due to
disciplinary problems. Id. at 37, 352 S.E.2d at 676.




12. The North Carolina statute prohibiting such sexual offenses provides in part:
(a) A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree if the person engages in a
sexual act with another person:
(1) By force and against the will of the other person....
(b) Any person who commits the offense defined in this section is guilty of a Class D
felony.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.5 (1986). "Sexual act" is defined as: "cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or
anal intercourse, but does not include vaginal intercourse. Sexual act also means the penetration,
however slight, by any object into the genital or anal opening of another person's body: provided,
that it shall be an affirmative defense that the penetration was for accepted medical purposes." Id.
§ 14-27.1(4). A Class D felony is "punishable by imprisonment up to 40 years, or a fine or both."
Id. § 14-1.1(a)(3).
13. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 36, 352 S.E.2d at 675. Defendant was also convicted of one count
each of taking indecent liberties with a child and crime against nature for the incident with the boy.
Id. Neither of these offenses requires force or a lack of consent. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-177, 14-
202.1 (1986).
The jury found Etheridge guilty of four counts each of first degree rape, taking indecent liberties
with a child, and incest for the four instances of sexual intercourse with his daughter. Etheridge, 319
N.C. at 36, 352 S.E.2d at 675.
14. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (1986).
15. The trial judge initially instructed the jury to return a conviction if it found that:
[T]he son, out of fear and respect for the father, did what his father instructed him to do
... and that he would not have [submitted to the act] except for such fear and the knowl-
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State's evidence insufficient to prove force.
1 6
The defendant appealed directly to the North Carolina Supreme Court, ar-
guing that the verdict was contrary to prior decisions of that court. The defend-
ant's argument relied heavily on State v. Alston 17 and its progeny, State v.-
Lester.'8 In Alston the court held an adult victim's general fear of an attacker
based on knowledge of prior acts of violence by the attacker was insufficient to
show the force necessary to uphold a conviction of rape.' 9 In Lester the court
affirmed a North Carolina Court of Appeals decision holding such fear insuffi-
cient to support a father's conviction for second degree rape of his fifteen-year-
old daughter.2
0
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Etheridge overruled Lester and up-
held the defendant's conviction for second degree sexual offense.21 The court
stated "[tihe youth and vulnerability of children, coupled with the power inher-
ent in a parent's position of authority, creates a unique situation of dominance
and control in which explicit threats and displays of force are not necessary to
effect the abuser's purpose."'22 The court concluded that the relationship be-
tween Etheridge and his son could support a finding of constructive force.
23
Force and lack of consent are elements of both first and second degree rape
and sexual offense unless the victim is under twelve years of age or incapaci-
tated.24 Consent is a defense to a sexual offense charge, but consent induced by
edge that his father, who was an adult, could discipline him in one or more ways if he did
not obey the instructions... that the force was sufficient to overcome any resistance which
[the boy] might have normally gained from some other person.
Record at 24, Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (No. 141A86). The defendant objected to this
instruction and asked for a curative instruction, which the judge gave as follows:
[W]hen the son failed to remove his clothes, his father then instructed him again in a more
forceful or louder voice in such a manner as to imply the threat of force or discipline to the
son by the father if he did not do what the father directed him to do, and the father then
directing him to get on the bed and lay down, which the son did, and that such force or
threat of force, out of respect and fear for the father, was sufficient to overcome any
resistance.
Id. at 26.
16. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 44, 352 S.E.2d at 680. Defendant also appealed the admission of the
testimony of a nurse from whom he sought medical treatment while in police custody. Id. at 38-39,
352 S.E.2d at 676. The nurse testified that the defendant, fearing he had a venereal disease, told the
nurse he had sexual contact with his son and daughter. Id. Defendant argued this testimony vio-
lated his physician-patient privilege, the Miranda ruling, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-163 (1986)
which provides for confidentiality of records of venereal disease. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 38-44, 352
S.E.2d at 676-680. The court found each of these arguments to be without merit. Id.
17. 310 N.C. 399, 312 S.E.2d 470 (1984).
18. 70 N.C. App. 757, 321 S.E.2d 166 (1984), affd per curiam, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d 205
(1985).
19. Alston, 310 N.C. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
20. Lester, 70 N.C. App. at 761, 321 S.E.2d at 168.
21. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 47, 352 S.E.2d at 681.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. If the victim is "under the age of 13 years," the rape or sexual offense is in the first degree.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2, 14-27.4 (1986). If the victim is "mentally defective, mentally incapaci-
tated, or physically helpless," and the defendant knows or reasonably should know the victim's
condition, the offense is in the second degree. Id. §§ 14-27.3, 14-27.5. Consent and lack of force are
not defenses to charges involving either of these victims. See, e.g., State v. Cobb, 395 N.C. 1, 20, 243
1988] CRIMINAL LAWf 1179
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fear of bodily harm is invalid.25 The requisite force need not be actual physical
force. Threats of serious bodily injury are sufficient to constitute constructive
force.
26
What acts constitute constructive force is determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis. In State v. Alston 27 the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected as construc-
tive force a history of physical abuse perpetrated on the victim by the
defendant.28 For six months the defendant and the victim in Alston lived to-
gether in a consensual sexual relationship. 29 Like any couple, they argued; un-
like most couples, however, the defendant sometimes resorted to violence. After
one such violent argument, the victim ended the relationship. One month later
the defendant approached the victim outside the school she attended.30 He
grabbed her arm and the two began walking. The defendant released the vic-
tim's arm, but because she was afraid, she did not run away.
The two walked around the neighborhood discussing their relationship.
During the conversation, the defendant threatened to "fix" her face 3' and
claimed the right to have sex with her. The defendant and the victim walked to
the home of a friend of the defendant where the victim told the defendant she
would not have sex with him. The defendant took off the victim's pants; she
pulled them back on and he removed them again.32 He ordered her to lie down
on a bed, pushed her legs apart, and had sexual intercourse with her.
The defendant was convicted of second-degree rape, and the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction finding the intercourse forcible
and nonconsensual. 33 In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court held the
S.E.2d 759, 770 (1978) (force is not an element of the rape of a 12 year old); State v. Cox, 280 N.C.
689, 695, 187 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1972) (consent is not a defense to a rape of a child under 12).
The difference between a first and second-degree sexual offense involving a victim over 13 with
no mental or physical debilitations is the presence of at least one of three aggravating factors. First-
degree rape or sexual offense is forcible and non-consensual if the defendant:
a. Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article which the other per-
son reasonably believes to be a dangerous or deadly weapon; or
b. Inflicts serious personal injury upon the victim or another person; or
c. The person commits the offense aided and abetted by one or more other persons.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4 (1986).
Rape and sexual offense differ in the type of contact prohibited. Rape pertains only to vaginal
intercourse, whereas sexual offenses are acts of penetration involving other than the penis and va-
gina. See supra note 12.
25. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 407, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475 (1984); State v. Hall, 293
N.C. 559, 563, 238 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1977); see Note, State v. Moorman, Can Sex with a Sleeping
Woman Constitute Forcible Rape, 65 N.C.L. REv. 1246, 1257 (1987). Consent is not a defense to a
statutory rape or sexual offense or such acts with a helpless victim. See supra note 24.
26. See, eg., Alston, 310 N.C. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
27. 310 N.C. 399, 312 S.E.2d 470 (1984).
28. Id. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
29. Id. at 400, 312 S.E.2d at 471.
30. Id. at 401, 312 S.E.2d at 471.
31. Id. at 402, 312 S.E.2d at 472.
32. Id. at 403, 312 S.E.2d at 473.
33. 61 N.C. App. 454, 459, 300 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1983). Judge Webb, writing for the court of
appeals, found the intercourse to be nonconsensual and the victim to be in such a position that any
resistance would be futile. Id. at 460, 300 S.E.2d at 860.
1180 [Vol. 66
CRIMINAL LAW
State's evidence insufficient to support a conviction.34 Although the evidence
established that the intercourse was nonconsensual, it was not achieved by ac-
tual or constructive force.3 5 In reaching its decision the court focused on the
relation the force must bear to the act to support a rape conviction. The force or
threat must be connected to the act of intercourse:3 6 the defendant must use
force or threats for the purpose of quelling any resistance by the victim.3 7 The
court found the defendant's use of force in grabbing the victim's arm and his
threats that he would "fix" her face unrelated to the intercourse despite the fear
they induced in the victim.
3 s
The court then considered whether the victim's fear of the defendant based
on past episodes of violence at his hands could be a factor in finding force.
3 9
The court did not require an explicit threat; rather, constructive force could be
found if "the totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable inference
that the unspoken purpose of the threat was to force the victim to submit to
unwanted sexual intercourse. ' 4° However, the court held the "totality of the
circumstances" did not infer such a purpose:
Although [the victim's] general fear of the defendant may have been
justified by his conduct on prior occasions, absent evidence that the
defendant used force or threats to overcome the will of the victim to
resist the sexual intercourse alleged to have been rape, such general fear
was not sufficient to show that the defendant used the force required to
support a conviction of rape.
4 1
The extent of the Alston holding and the reasoning on which it rested are
ambiguous. The clearest holding of the case is that the victim's general fear of
the defendant, based on past acts she witnessed during their relationship, alone
cannot be the basis for satisfying the force requirement. This result could be
34. Alston, 310 N.C. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
35. Id. Professor Estrich in her article on rape strongly criticizes this result:
That these decisions [Alston and Lester] depart so straight forwardly from established
criminal law doctrine is noteworthy but not unusual in the law of rape. More interesting is
the apparent paradox that they create. In each case, the court says- and this is explicit,
not implicit-that sex was without the woman's consent. It also says that there was no
force. In other words, the woman was not forced to engage in sex, but the sex she engaged
in was against her will.
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087, 1111 (1986).
36. Alston, 310 N.C. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 475.
37. Id. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
38. Id. According to the court:
[The defendant] told [the victim] he was going to "fix" her face so that her mother could
see he was not "playing." This threat by the defendant and his act of grabbing [the victim]
by the arm at the school, although they may have induced fear, appeared to have been
unrelated to the act of sexual intercourse between [the victim] and the defendant.
Id.
39. Id. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
40. Id.; see State v. Barnette, 304 N.C. 447, 460, 284 S.E.2d 298, 306 (1981). This "totality of
the circumstances" inquiry itself has two issues. First, there must be at least a threat. Overt force, of
course, is actual rather than constructive force. Second, if that threat is not explicitly directed at
overcoming the victim's resistance, the situation in which the threat was made reasonably must
imply such a purpose. The reasonableness is apparently objective-thus the question is not whether
the victim so interpreted the threat, but whether such an interpretation is reasonable.
41. Alston, 310 N.C. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476 (emphasis in original).
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rooted in the requirement-that the threat be for the purpose of accomplishing the
sexual act: the defendant's acts of violence or threats in the past cannot be for
the purpose of overcoming the victim's resistance to sexual intercourse in the
present. Alternatively, the court could have created a special rule to deal with a
particular situation-allegations of rape made by one person against an ex-
lover.42 Consistent with the general law on the topic, 43 however, the court dis-
cussed the prior consensual relationship's bearing on the issue of consent,44 not
force, explicitly stating that the intercourse was nonconsensual.
45
Within one year, the court in State v. Lester 46 expanded Alston to situations
not involving a prior consensual sexual relationship. In Lester the defendant
had sexual intercourse with his fifteen-year-old daughter.47 He began sexual ac-
tivity with the girl when she was eleven and also engaged in sexual activity with
his other two daughters. The family life was quite violent; the defendant often
beat his ex-wife, his son, his girlfriend, and once pointed a gun at his children.48
The defendant's ex-wife learned of his sexual activity with their daughter and
confronted the defendant, who threatened to kill his ex-wife or daughter if either
revealed to anyone what had occurred. In the two incidents of sexual inter-
course from which the charges arose, the defendant ordered his daughter to un-
dress. The daughter initially refused, then submitted when she perceived the
defendant getting angry.49 After one of these incidents, the defendant slapped
the victim, accusing her of "messing with other boys."50 The defendant was
convicted of two counts of second-degree rape. 51
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found evidence the sexual inter-
course between the father and daughter was against the daughter's will.
5 2
Under Alston, however, the evidence showed neither actual nor constructive
force.53 Without acknowledging the differences between the relationship of an
adult woman to her ex-boyfriend and a minor child to her father, the court
42. The court simply may have found the victim incredible because she slept with the defendant
after the alleged rape. Id. at 403, 312 S.E.2d at 472.
43. See State v. Way, 297 N.C. 293, 296, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979).
44. The court stated:
Where as here the victim has engaged in a prior continuing consensual sexual relationship
with the defendant, however, determining the victim's state of mind at the time of the
alleged rape obviously is made more difficult. Although inquiry in such cases still must be
made into the victim's state of mind at the time of the alleged rape, the State ordinarily will
be able to show the victim's lack of consent to the specific act charged only by evidence of
statements or actions by the victim which were clearly communicated to the defendant and
which expressly and unequivocally indicated the victim's withdrawal of any prior consent
and lack of consent to the particular act of intercourse.
Alston, 310 N.C. at 407-08, 312 S.E.2d at 475.
45. Id. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 475.
46. 70 N.C. App. 757, 321 S.E.2d 166 (1984), aff'dper curiam, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d 205
(1985).
47. Id. at 761, 321 S.E.2d at 168.
48. Id. at 758-59, 321 S.E.2d at 167.
49. Id. at 759, 321 S.E.2d at 167.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 758, 321 S.E.2d at 166.
52. Id at 761, 321 S.E.2d at 168.
53. Id. For a criticism of this result see supra note 35.
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vacated the verdict: "As Alston makes clear, the victim's fear of defendant, how-
ever justified by his previous conduct, is insufficient to show that defendantforci-
bly raped his daughter."
'54
Judge Phillips dissented from the majority opinion, finding two significant
circumstances which rendered Lester clearly distinguishable from Alston. First,
Phillips found the threat of force ever present since "the child was under defend-
ant's constant and continuing control and dominion."5 5 Second, he found the
location of one of the incidents of intercourse, the defendant's and victim's
home, bore heavily on the issue of force. 56 Although he did not explain the
significance of the latter point, it implies the daughter's inability to resist or
avoid the attack-. In effect, she had nowhere else to go.57 The North Carolina
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Lester without a written opinion.58
Following the decision in Lester the rejection of the general fear theory
appeared total and without exception. Within two years, however, the court
cast doubt on the extent of the applicability of Alston. In State v. Strickland 59
the victim and the defendant were neighbors and had never engaged in sexual
activity prior to the attack.6" On the night of the attack, the victim was ill and
home alone. The defendant broke a locked screened door, entered, grabbed the
victim from behind, dragged her into a bedroom, and had sexual intercourse
with her.
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court from a conviction of sec-
ond-degree rape, the defendant challenged the State's evidence as proving no
more than the victim's general fear of the defendant, and thus insufficient under
the Alston analysis.6 1 The court held the defendant inappropriately invoked Al-
ston, stating that only in "fact situations similar to those in Alston" will general
fear not satisfy the force requirement. 62 The court noted the defendant and vic-
tim had no shared sexual history and, in addition, the State introduced substan-
tial evidence that the defendant employed actual physical force as well as
constructive force against the victim.
63
Although evidencing a trend towards allowing the general fear theory in
certain situations, the Strickland court did not explain the extent of this allow-
ance. Permitting the State to prove force through the victim's general fear of the
defendant except in "fact situations similar to those in Alston" could give the
54. Lester, 70 N.C. App. at 761, 321 S.E.2d at 168 (emphasis in original).
55. Id. at 762, 321 S.E.2d at 169 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Judge Phillips may have been considering the doctrine of retreat and analogizing the vic-
tims of intrafamilial sexual abuse to the victim of assault and battery who is attacked in her own
home. This doctrine, requiring a person to "retreat to the wall" before using force to defend against
an attack does not apply to unprovoked attacks in one's dwelling. See 6 AM. JuR. 2D Assault and
Battery § 75 (1963).
58. State v. Lester, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (per curiam).
59. 318 N.C. 653, 351 S.E.2d 281 (1987).
60. Id. at 654, 351 S.E.2d at 282.
61. Id. at 655, 351 S.E.2d at 282.
62. Id. at 656, 351 S.E.2d at 283.
63. Id.
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general fear theory a broad or narrow application depending upon the signifi-
cance given to the individual facts of Alston. 64 These facts could be interpreted
narrowly, as involving a prior consensual sexual relationship with instances of
violence between the adult victim and defendant, or broadly, as concerning a
situation where the victim is aware of prior acts of violence by the defendant. A
narrow view of the exception would allow the State to prove force through gen-
eral fear in most cases and would overrule Lester.65 Classifying the facts
broadly would render the availability of the theory quite limited,66 leaving the
decision in Lester untouched. Any interpretation in between leaves Lester un-
certain. The Strickland decision, therefore, without overruling Lester, cast
doubt on its continuing validity.67
Etheridge, decided one month after Strickland, removed all doubts sur-
rounding the viability of Lester. The court called the Lester decision a "misbe-
gotten offspring" 68 that "carried Alston far beyond its intended scope." 69
Noting "[s]exual activity between a parent and a minor child is not comparable
to sexual activity between two adults with a history of consensual inter-
course," 70 the Etheridge court expressly allowed convictions for forcible in-
trafamilial sexual assault solely upon a showing of general fear. Having
overruled Lester the court considered the separate issue of whether the evidence
presented by the State reasonably supported the finding of force inherent in the
conviction. The evidence was held sufficient because the abuse began at an early
age and because of the nature of the parent-child relationship. The defendant's
abusive practices "conditioned [the victim] to succumb to defendant's illicit ad-
vances at an age when he could not yet fully comprehend the implications of
defendant's conduct." 71 The court found the parental relationship to be one of
domination and control: "the parent wields authority as another assailant might
wield a weapon. The authority itself intimidates; the implicit threat to exercise
it coerces."'72
A defendant who plays a parental role in the victim's world can greatly
64. Justice Webb, dissenting in Strickland, argued its result could not be justified without over-
ruling Alston:
I note that the majority opinion contains the following statement. "This 'general fear'
theory is applicable only to fact situations similar to those in Alston." If the majority
means by this that Alston on its facts has no precedential value I might concur. There are
other interpretations however, and I therefore dissent.
Id. at 663, 351 S.E.2d at 286.
65. The victim in Lester was not an adult. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. Though
she had engaged in a prior sexual relationship with the defendant, that relationship began before the
victim could legally consent. See supra note 24.
66. Interpreting the facts in Aiston broadly may effectively render the general fear theory un-
available to the State. A reasonable general fear must be based on knowledge of past acts, but under
the broad classification, the theory would not apply in that situation.
67. Since Strickland arguably rests on the defendant's use of actual, overt physical force to
accomplish the act of intercourse, the opinion in Strickland rendered the validity of Lester and the
extent of the applicability of Aiston uncertain.
68. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 44, 352 S.E.2d at 680.
69. Id. at 45, 352 S.E.2d at 680.
70. Id. at 47, 352 S.E.2d at 681.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 48, 352 S.E.2d at 682.
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influence and dominate that world.73 He or she is the victim's authoritarian,
enforcing that authority through the role of disciplinarian.74 Etheridge recog-
nizes that in any order given by a parent these dual roles create an implied threat
of some sort of disciplinary action.75 As one researcher of intrafamilial sexual
abuse noted, "Because of the actual physical violence or the aura of it, in many
of these families a well spoken word has as much power as a slap."'7 6 The court
acknowledged that "force can be understood in some contexts as the power one
need not use."' 77 The victim is young, inexperienced, and perhaps ignorant of
the "wrongness" of the conduct. The child may submit because he does not
know he can resist or because he assumes the conduct is acceptable. Etheridge's
son, for example, did not learn that the sexual acts to which he submitted were
considered reprehensible until he viewed a film at school on child abuse.
78
The traditional definition of constructive force as "threats of serious bodily
harm"7 9 is an adult standard and does not adequately reflect the coercion ex-
erted by a parent on a child. The abusive parent often obtains the victim's si-
lence through threats to the stability and survival of the family,80 or to the
victim's loved ones.8 ' The concept of serious bodily injury may be less compre-
hensible to the child than traditional punishments such as being grounded or
being deprived of something the child wants.8 2 Fear for the parent resulting
from love or respect may play an equal or greater role than fear of threats of
serious bodily harm in coercing the child to submit to the sexual act.8 3
73. One professor of psychiatry noted that even where the contact is not ultimately harmful,
sex is a situation in which the participants should meet each other equally rather than the vastly one-
sided encounter of adult-child relationships:
It should be enough to understand unequivocally that sexualization of a childcaring rela-
tionship is, in itself, a violation of ethics.... The child has no power to say no and has no
information on which to base a decision. Since the long-term psychological effects are so
uncertain, and since the adult has such a vested interest in minimizing those risks, no
modem concept of ethics, liability, or consumer protection could ever endorse such a lop-
sided contract. The child is just as powerless within the intimidating or ingratiating rela-
tionship as the adult rape victim would be at the point of a knife.
Summit, supra note 5, at 52.
74. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 48, 352 S.E.2d at 681-82.
75. Id. at 48, 352 S.E.2d at 682.
76. M. DE YOUNG, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF CHILDREN 34 (1982).
77. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 48, 352 S.E.2d at 682. For this proposition, the court cited Profes-
sor Estrich's article, which strongly criticized the holdings of Aiston and Lester. See Estrich, supra
note 35.
78. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 47, 352 S.E.2d at 681.
79. See, e.g., Alston, 310 N.C. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 476; State v. Barnette, 304 N.C. 447, 460,
284 S.E.2d 298, 306 (1981).
80. M. DE YOUNG, supra note 76, at 37-38; Summit, supra note 5, at 67. The abuser may
expressly tell the victim he will abandon the family or will be removed by the criminal justice system
if the victim discloses the abuse. M. DE YOUNG, supra note 76, at 38. The child may also learn the
precariousness of the family stability from the nonabusive parent's reaction to disclosure of the
abuse. Summit, supra note 5, at 67. The child may deny or recant the existence of the abuse in order
to keep the family together by keeping the family secret. Id.
81. M. DE YOUNG, supra note 76, at 38.
82. Intrafamilial sexual abuse is by no means devoid of violence. Many sexual abuse victims
are also victims of physical abuse or witness such abuse of family members. M. DE YOUNG, supra
note 76, at 37-38.
83. 11. SLOAN, PROTECTION OF ABUSED VICTIMs 83 (1982) ("There is rarely an application of
force or threat of bodily harm, and more often the child is psychologically enticed by loyalty to,
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Etheridge applies a more flexible definition than the traditional definition of
constructive force. The court described force as "threats or other actions by the
defendant which compel the victim's submission to sexual acts,"'8 4 and affirmed
the conviction despite, as defendant argued in his brief,85 the absence of evidence
that defendant threatened the child with serious injury or that the child feared
such injury.8 6 The general fear theory assumes a present fear based on past acts,
and those acts and the totality of the circumstances lead to a reasonable infer-
ence that an implicit threat exists. The defendant in Etheridge, unlike those in
Alston and Lester, had no history of violent acts.87 The general fear, therefore,
need not be based on knowledge of specific past acts of violence by the defendant
but can be based on threats which themselves need not be of serious bodily
harm.
The sexual assault is not examined in isolation; rather, the age of the child
at the initial assault is significant. Repetitive sexual abuse, like any continuous
abuse, often conditions the child to submit.88 The first sexual act may have been
committed forcibly, even under an Alston analysis, but after the second, third, or
fourth, resistance seems more futile when the child believes the adult will inevi-
tably accomplish the act.89 Ironically, the first sexual act may have been statu-
torily prohibited regardless of whether it was forcibly accomplished because the
victim was under the age of consent.90
Not only may a child victim be conditioned from past experience to submit
to sexual acts with the parent, the child may be effectively unable to prevent
such acts in the future. Other than running away from home or employing vio-
lence against the parent, telling someone who can stop the activity is the only
method a child can use to end the abuse. Assuming the child can muster the
courage to overcome any embarrassment, the child could tell the nonabusive
parent. The other parent, however, is often not a member of the household, is
affection with, and dependence upon the adult caretaker."); Summit, supra note 5, at 59-60; cf M.
DE YOUNG, supra note 76, at 37-38 (sexual abuse often occurs in families in which physical abuse is
prevalent).
84. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 45, 352 S.E.2d at 680.
85. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 13-14, Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 352 S.E.2d 673 (No.
141A86).
86. The boy testified that the defendant had threatened to send him to a training school, but the
only threat of physical harm to the boy occurred after the act of anal intercourse. Etheridge, 319
N.C. at 37, 352 S.E.2d at 675.
87. See supra text accompanying note 7. The daughter testified that she had been disciplined by
defendant but not in connection with any sexual acts. Brief for Defendant at 13.
88. See M. DE YOUNG, supra note 76, at 35; Summit supra note 5, at 60-63. Many adult
abusers consciously condition the child victim through continuous physical contact with the child
which gradually changes in nature from the merely affectionate to the overtly sexual. M. DE
YOUNG, supra note 76, at 35 (fathers of thirty-one percent of victimized daughters studied "re-
hearsed" incest with the victim). Another frequently employed technique is the father getting into
bed and initiating sexual contact with the sleeping victim. Id. The victim invariably awakens, but
remains immobile pretending to be asleep. Id. at 35-36; Summit, supra note 5, at 59-60. Studies
indicate that perhaps eighteen to thirty-five percent of incest begins in this manner. M. DE YOUNG,
supra note 76, at 35.
89. Ongoing sexual assault is rarely disclosed. Summit, supra note 5, at 63. If disclosure oc-
curs, it may be a by-product of the victim entering adolescence and the desire for autonomy that
stage brings. Id.
90. See supra note 24.
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afraid of the abusive parent, or finds the situation too embarrassing or painful to
admit.9 1 Often the child who knows the conduct is illegal is prohibited by that
very knowledge from telling the authorities.92 Police involvement means the
parent will "get into trouble." Despite all, the child is often bound as much by
love as fear.9 3 Consequently, informing someone outside the household-some-
one in a position of authority-may be an impossible alternative from the child's
standpoint. The Etheridge standard is more sensitive to the child's dilemma by
not requiring a clear showing of force on each occasion independent of the vic-
tim's past experience, even after the victim exceeds the age of consent.
94
The Etheridge decision is significant in its protection of minors above the
statutory age of consent.95 The need for clearly defined criminal offenses occa-
sionally results in arbitrary line drawing between conduct of fairly equivalent
culpability. No legal area more clearly demonstrates this arbitrariness than the
area of sexual offenses against minors. Such offenses differ from other crimes in
that the conduct is condemned because of the nature of the victim and not the
nature of the conduct. The line is drawn at a certain age with victims who are
above or below that age treated differently by the law.
North Carolina has three categories of statutes specifically aimed at
preventing child sexual assault. The first category consists of the statutory first-
degree rape96 and sexual offense 97 provisions which prohibit sexual intercourse,
vaginal and nonvaginal, 98 between adults and children below the age of consent.
At thirteen, 99 North Carolina's age of consent for sexual intercourse is the low-
est in the United States. 100 A child who is thirteen can consent to sexual inter-
course and is a victim of rape or a sexual offense only if she was forced to
91. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN: THE FIGHT AGAINsT MOLESTATION 2
(1984); Summit, supra note 5, at 65-67. The nonabusive parent, usually the mother, is often unaware
of the abuse or protectively denies its existence. Summit, supra note 5, at 65. This parent often turns
her anger toward the child, accusing the child of seducing the father and threatening the stability of
the family. Id. at 67.
92. The child who is aware of the illegality of the conduct may fear the effect disclosure will
have on the family. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
93. See Summit, supra note 5, at 60-63.
94. This may have been a consideration of the court when it stated, "[t]he child was condi-
tioned to succumb to defendant's illicit advances at an age when he could not yet fully comprehend
the implications of defendant's conduct." Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 47, 352 S.E.2d at 681.
95. The age of consent is the age at which a child is deemed able to consent to the sexual
activity. See supra note 24.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (1986).
97. Id. § 14-27.4(a)(1).
98. See supra notes 12 and 24.
99. N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-27 (1986).
100. Michigan and New Mexico also prohibit intercourse only with persons under thirteen.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.788(2) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (1978). Most
states have a statutory structure which graduates the severity of the penalty according to the age of
the victim. See, eg., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3122-3123 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-650 (Law.
Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-603, -605 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61, -63 (1982).
In those states other than North Carolina, Michigan, and New Mexico which have only one relevant
age, that age varies between 14 and 16. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 762-763, 768 (1974)
(16 years old); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2801, -3502 (1981) (16 years old); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-3
to -4 (1984) (14 years old); HAw. REv. STAT. § 707-731, -734 (1985) (14 years old); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-6101 (1987) (18 years old); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3503 (1981) (16 years old). For a thorough
comparative survey of incest and child sexual abuse laws, see I. SLOAN, supra note 83.
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submit.10 1 The second category prohibits taking indecent liberties with a child
under sixteen. 102 The prohibited acts may fall short of acts of penetration and
are defined as being "for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire."' 10 3
Taking indecent liberties with a child is not a lesser included offense of rape or
sexual offense.1°4 Since the offenses are independent, a defendant can be con-
victed of both for the same incident or of taking indecent liberties for an incident
which was not a statutory rape or sexual offense. The child is legally deemed
unable to consent and force is irrelevant.10 5 The third category prohibits sexual
acts between a person and someone in that person's custody.'0 6 This statute
expressly prohibits sexual acts, consensual and nonconsensual, between a parent
and minor child.' 0 7
The facts of Etheridge illustrate the gaps in these North Carolina statutes at
their extreme. The defendant was convicted of first degree rape for having sex-
ual intercourse with his daughter. To obtain that conviction, the State had to
prove two facts: the act occurred, and the child was below thirteen years old.
To convict the defendant of a second degree sexual offense for the incident of
anal intercourse with the boy, who was only a year older than the girl, required
proof that the act occurred with force and without consent. Any rigid age limit
results in arbitrariness. By allowing a child's general fear of a parent to suffice as
force, Etheridge lessens the rigidity of the law and provides more protection for
children above the age of consent.
The effect of the Etheridge decision on sexual assaults on minors by persons
other than parents is unclear. Etheridge can be interpreted as a narrow applica-
tion of the general fear theory in that a victim's general fear of a sexual attacker
can be considered force only in cases of intrafamilial sexual assault. 108 Under
this narrow interpretation, general fear could not constitute force if the defen-
dant was not in a parental role in relation to the victim. However, Etheridge by
its reasoning should at least extend to any assault by an authoritarian adult upon
a minor. Thus, a teacher or other custodian who takes advantage of his author-
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4 (1986); see supra note 24.
102. Id. § 14-202.1. The defendant must be at least 16 years old and 5 years older than the child.
103. Id.
104. State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 636, 295 S.E.2d 375, 379 (1982); see Survey, Criminal Law,
61 N.C.L. REv. 1060, 1082-87 (1983).
105. See supra, notes 24-25.
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (1986).
107. Section 14-27.7 provides in part:
If a defendant who has assumed the position of a parent in the home of a minor victim
engages in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with a victim who is a minor residing in the
home,... the defendant is guilty of a Class G felony. Consent is not a defense to a charge
under this section.
Id. A Class G felony is punishable by a fine or imprisonment up to 15 years or both. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-1.1 (1986). For the definition of "sexual act," see supra note 12.
Incest is "carnal intercourse" between person who are of a particular blood or legal relation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-178 to 179. Incest pertains only to vaginal intercourse and is divided into
two levels of severity according to the closeness of the relation. Id. Incest is not a crime specifically
aimed at the protection of minors, and arguably a literal reading of the statute would include as
offenders minors who participated in sexual intercourse with a listed relative.
108. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 47, 352 S.E.2d at 681.
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ity to intimidate the child into sexual submission could be guilty of a forcible
sexual assault.
Whether the justification for allowing a general fear to suffice as force ap-
plies where no authoritarian relationship other than age exists is more problem-
atic. If the victim is a minor over the age of twelve and defendant is an adult
who has no authority over the child and in fact may not know the child prior to
the act, can the Etheridge rationale apply? Arguably the North Carolina stat-
utes contemplate such a situation and Etheridge should not apply. The sexual
offense statutes assume a degree of knowledge at certain ages. At thirteen a
child is presumed to be able to consent to sexual intercourse, yet an adult de-
fendant who engages in such acts with the child before the child reaches sixteen
may face criminal charges. 10 9 Thus, the legislature has made a determination of
the ages of various levels of sexual maturation and the severity of punishment
for sexual activity with persons below those ages. Nonetheless, the general fear
theory should be available if warranted by the circumstances. Children are
taught to obey adults. A defendant who relies on a child's general respect of his
elders to accomplish a sexual act may be as culpable as an authoritarian who
relies on the child's specific respect of that authority.
In addition to overruling Lester, the court's decision in Etheridge stands as
a limitation of the Alston rejection of the general fear theory in sexual assaults
against adults.110 The extent of the limitation is unclear. The language in
Strickland and Etheridge can be read to strip Alston of any viability beyond its
peculiar facts. Under this view, general fear can be a basis for constructive force
in any case in which the defendant was not in a prior consensual sexual relation-
ship with the victim. The justification for retaining the Alston rule in such situa-
tions is the fear of unfounded rape accusations resulting from conflicts in the
relationship. The Alston holding may help to address this fear by effectively
precluding conviction where actual force or explicit threats are not used. How-
ever, the Alston rule acts at the expense of valid accusations by victims whose
fear is justified and is relied upon by the defendant. 1 I The existence of a prior
consensual sexual relationship is an issue affecting consent and not force. A
person who has experienced violence at another's hands should be able to act on
that knowledge, and submit to unwanted intercourse rather than risk injury.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Etheridge is certainly a
step in the right direction. The court strongly rejected Lester, a decision which
exacerbated the problem of child sexual abuse by ignoring the realities of the
parent-child relationship. The court also voiced disapproval of the Alston rejec-
tion of the general fear rationale. Perhaps Etheridge will be the first of many
109. Until the child reaches 16, sexual activity is prohibited as taking indecent liberties with a
child. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
110. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 44, 352 S.E.2d at 680.
111. Justice Webb, author of the later reversed court of appeals' decision upholding the defend-
ant's conviction in Alston, has urged for its reversal. Etheridge, 319 N.C. at 51-52, 352 S.E.2d at
683-84 (Webb, J., dissenting); Strickland, 318 N.C. at 662-63, 351 S.E.2d at 286 (Webb, J., dissent-
ing); see Estrich, supra note 35, at 1105-11.
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decisions stripping Alston of any continued validity and dragging North Caro-
lina's rape law into the twentieth century.
SERINA MONTGOMERY GARST
